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Summary.  In many existing markets demanders wish to buy more than one unit 
from a  group of identical  units  of a  commodity. Often,  the units are sold  simul- 
taneously by auction. The vast majority of literature pertaining to the economics 
of auctions, however, considers environments in which demanders buy at most one 
object. In this paper we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for a set of bidding 
strategies to be a symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium to a uniform price 
sealed bid auction using the "first rejected bid pricing rule" in an independent private 
values environment with two-unit demands.  In any symmetric monotone Bayes- 
Nash equilibrium, all bidders submit one bid equal to their higher valuation and 
one  bid  lower  than  their  lower valuation.  We characterize  the  equilibrium  and 
derive the exact amount of underrevelation in the lower bid. 
1.  Introduction 
Auctions are used in every part of the world to transact trillions of dollars worth 
of  objects  every  year.  The  omnipresence  of  auctions  has  certainly  not  gone 
unnoticed by economists who have generated a huge literature on the subject. Most 
of the  literature  focuses  on environments  where  a  single seller has  one  or more 
indivisible object(s) to be sold to multiple bidders, each of whom wants to buy at 
most one of the  objects.  In the first major paper on  the  subject,  Vickrey (1961) 
introduces  the  second  price sealed  bid  auction  and its multi-unit  generalization, 
the  uniform  price  sealed  bid  auction  with  "first  rejected  bid"  pricing.  In  an 
environment in which each demander independently draws one valuation, known 
only to her, from a  distribution  which is known to all demanders, these auctions 
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are demand revealing. Each bidder has a dominant strategy to submit a bid equal 
to the value she has drawn. 
In most markets where auctions are currently used, however, it is common for 
buyers to wish to buy more than one unit of the commodity. If a demander wishes 
to and is permitted to purchase more than one unit, non-uniform pricing is required 
to induce  demand  revelation (Vickrey (1961),  Forsythe and  Isaac (1982),  Weber 
(1983)). 2 The demand  revealing auctions  are quite  complex and  in  many appli- 
cations  the  simplicity of a  uniform  pricing  rule  may  be  preferred  or  required. 
Assessing  the  consequences  of using  a  uniform  price  auction  and  the  resulting 
strategic behavior on the part of bidders  requires  an analysis of the equilibrium 
properties of the  particular auction  applied.  Characterization  of equilibria  for a 
simple uniform price auction is thus the focus of this paper. 
In the  next section  we model a  uniform  price sealed  bid  auction  with  "first 
rejected bid" pricing in an independent  private values environment with two-unit 
demands.  In  theorem  1,  we list  necessary  conditions  for a  bidding  rule  to  be  a 
symmetric undominated  strictly  monotone  Bayes-Nash  equilibrium.  In  equili- 
brium, each demander bids his valuation for his higher-valued unit and less than 
his  valuation for his lower-valued unit.  The exact amount  of underrevelation  is 
derived  in  lemma 2.  The  bidding  function  must  be separable, in  the  sense  that 
each bidder's lower bid is independent  of his higher valuation and vice-versa. In 
theorem 2, sufficient conditions for a bidding function satisfying the conditions of 
theorem 1 to be an equilibrium are given. 
2.  The uniform price sealed bid auction 
In this section we consider the theoretical properties of a simple uniform price sealed 
bid  auction  within  a  two-unit  demand independent  private values environment. 
Necessary  and  sufficient  conditions  for  a  bidding  function  to  be  a  symmetric 
monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium are derived, and an example is provided. 
2.1.  The model 
Let there be k (> 1) identical units to be sold and n +  1 (> 1) demanders indexed by 
i =  1  ..... n +  1.  Each demander draws two valuations independently from a  fixed 
and common distribution 7(v), where 7(v) has strictly positive density on [0, 6] c  R + 
and 7(v)eC  2. Order the two values from higher to lower and index them  1 and 2 
respectively, so that vii >  v~ _> 0 are the valuations of demander i. Define G(vil, v~) = 
Prob(vl < vil,v2 <_ v~), where vl  and v2 are a  pair of values independently drawn 
from 7(v). Let g(vl, v2) denote the probability density function of G. Since g is a joint 
density of order statistics drawn from a distribution with positive density on [0, 6], 
g(vl, v2) > 0 for all/)1,/32  such that 0 </)2 -</)1 "~ 6. All demanders are risk neutral. 
Valuations are private information but 7, n and k are common knowledge. 
1 Forsythe and Isaac (1982) show that the second price auction is the only demand revealing direct 
mechanism in the single-unit environment. 
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2.2.  The game 
All demanders  submit two non-negative bids. The highest k bids are accepted and 
the corresponding  demanders pay a per-unit price equal to the k +  1  st highest bid. 
A tie for kth highest bid is broken by randomly allocating a  unit to one of the tied 
demanders.  A bid which is equal to zero is never accepted. 
3.  Symmetric equilibria 
3.1.  Necessary conditions 
In  theorem  1  we  derive  a  necessary  condition  for  a  bidding  strategy  to  be  a 
symmetric monotone Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Let a  bidding function, B(vl, v2) = 
(BI(vl,v2),B2"(Vl, V2)):  [0,/~]2---->R 2+,  map  two  valuations  into  two  bids.  Two 
definitions are required  for the statement  and proof of the theorem. 
Definition 1.  A  bidding function, B(v 1, v2) is type M  if: 
1)  B(0,0) =  (0,0), 
2)  B  is continuous in v t and v2, 
3)  Bl(~,0>_ B2(~,~), 
4)  3 a function  0j(v:) such that Bj(v~, vj) =  0; iff vj <_ 0/(v:), for z :~j; z, je 1,2. 
5)  c?Bj exists and is  >0/f  Bj >  0 and ~B_J exists and is  >0; z r  0. 
8vj  Ov~ 
Definition  1 describes  a  notion  of continuous  monotonicity.  B 1  and  B 2  are 
monotone  in  both  of  their  arguments  and  strictly  monotone  in  one  of  them. 
However,  1) and  3) impose restrictions  on  the  bidding  function  which  make type 
M  differ from  more  standard  notions  of monotonicity.  The  type  M  class  allows 
bidding  strategies  which  specify that  Bj(vl, v2) =  0  for all  v 1 _< 01  and  v2 <  0 2,  for 
any  t~l~[0, g ]  and  any  ~2e[0, g].  It  includes,  as  a  special  case,  bidding  functions 
which are strictly increasing in v I and v2 (where 0 =  02 =  Vl). The important concept 
of separability is described  in definition  2. 
Definition 2.  A  bidding function  is separable if B(vl, v2) =  (B~ (v 1), Bz(v2) ).  That is, a 
demander's  bid for his higher (lower) valued unit is independent  of his lower (higher) 
valuation. 
We also introduce some additional notation, the functions H, T, and F, which are 
functions  of order statistics that help make the statement and proof of theorems  1 
and 2 more concise. Let 
,,  (fo:,fo  )' 
H(z 1, z 2, G, m, n, l) = I!m!(n -  m -  l)!  g(vl' v2)dv2dvl 
(;fo  <f; 
g(Vl, v2)dv2dVl) m  g(v 1, v2)dv2dvl  .  (1) 
1  x~  21  2 
The function H(-) is the probability that in a  sample of size n drawn from g(vl, v2), 
exactly  I observations  have  the  property  that  (v~ <_ z~,  vz <_ z2), exactly  m  obser- 
vations  have  the  property  that  (v~ >  z~,  v2 _< z2)  and  exactly  n -  m -  1 have  the 340  C. Noussair 
property that (v~ >  zl, 12 2 >  Z2). Let 
T(zl,zz,z3,G,n,k)=  ~m,t;m+zz=2.-k+lH(Zl'Zz'n'm'l) 
2.  /OH  OH  1 "~"  (2)  +--  )  Eq=2n--k+2Em,I;m+2l:q~oz1  Oz2 
The function  T(-) describes the amount by which bidders  underbid  on their lower 
valued unit in a  symmetric Type M  equilibrium.  Let 
(F *(x){B) =  Prob (at least v bids made by bidders other than i are less than or equal 
to x  if all bidders except for bidder  i use B). 
(F(i(x)[B)  is defined  for  v =  0 ..... 2n.  For  v >  0, (F(i(x)[B)  is  the  cumulative 
distribution  function of the vth order statistic of bids made by n randomly chosen 
demanders  using  strategy  B.  Let  f]i(x)]B  denote  the  corresponding  density 
function. 
Theorem 1.  A  bidding.['unction  is a  symmetric  undominated  type  M  Bayes  Nash 
equilibrium only if it equals/~(/21'/22) =  (fl1(/21'  /22)' fi2(/21' /22))'  where: 
fl~(/2x) =/2~  (3) 
and: 
where: 
{~--2  V2 -< V~ 
fi2(/22) =  (/22)  V  2_> V*,  (4) 
v; =  <n,k ) 
k  Or2 
and fi2 solves the differential equation: 
with the initial conditions: 
(5) 
(6) 
v*=0;  if n>k-1 
fi2(0 =  ~;  ifn<k-l 
fi2(0)  =  0;  q'  n  =  k  -  I.  (7) 
Theorem  1 is proven using lemmas 1 and 2, which are stated and proven in this 
subsection  and lemmas 3  7 in the appendix. 
Lemma 1.  If  a  bidding function  fl(vl,v2): (fll(Vl,V2),fl2(Vl,V2)), is  a  symmetric 
undominated type M  Bayes-Nash equilibrium, then ill(v l) = v l. 
Proof:  Suppose all n +  1 bidders  are using the same equilibrium  bidding function 
B*(vl, v2). For notational  ease, let F~ i*(x) = F~ i(x)[B*. Since B* is symmetric, V is 
common, and valuations  are drawn  independently,  F v-i*(x)= F~*(x)," Vi.  Bidder  i's 
expected profit is given in equation  (8). Equilibria in a bid auction  341 
￿9  (,,|i  .  M  * 
E~'=  (v'l--  2n-k+l)f2n-k+l(M2n-k+l)dM2n  k+l  J~ 
i 
+  (v', +v~-2M2,  k+2)f*,_k+2(M2,_k+2)dM2,_k+2 
+  (vii  -  b~)(F*.~+ ,(b~)- F*._~+~(b~)).  (8) 
where My is the vth lowest order statistic of bids made by bidders other than bidder 
i and b~ is thejth highest bid made by bidder i. The first term indicates the profit 
when the purchase price is between i's two bids, in which case the purchase price 
equals  Mzn_k+ 1.  The  second  term  gives  the  profit  when  both  of  i's  bids  are 
accepted, in which event he obtains two units at a per-unit price of M2,_k+ 2 and 
the third term gives the profits when i's lower bid is the k +  1st highest, in which 
event he receives one unit and pays a per-unit price ofb~. In all other cases, i's profits 
equal 0. 
In equilibrium, bidder i's two bids, bil and b~, are chosen to maximize (8) subject 
to bil >_ O, bi2 >_ O. The first order necessary (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions are given in 
equations (9) and (10): 
63  E Tc  i 
Ob'l 
--  --bl)f  2n_k+,,  = (v;  i  ,  (bil) = O;  b'~ > O, 
_< O;  b', = O,  (9) 
•ETr i 
￿9  i  *  i  *  i  *  b i  i  ab~  -(v'2-b2)f  2"-k+2(b2)-(Fzn  k+l(bz)--  Fzn-k+2(  2))=0;  b2 >0, 
_<0;  b~=O.  (10) 
If  .f*2n-k+l(bil)>O,  then  B*  is  separable  and  B~(vl)=v  1  for  vl>0._  If 
f*2n-k+ l(bil) = O,  then  there  can  be  more  than  one  solution  but  any  strategy  is 
￿9  "  -/if  weakly dominated by B*(vl) -= v 1.  b'  1 <  v'  1 results is profits lower than  bll -  v 1 
i  and equal otherwise, be~ >  vii results in profits to bidder i lower  bil <  M2,_k+ , <V 1 
than bl =  ~i if v  i  <  M2,_k+l <  b{ and equal otherwise￿9  [] 
We have shown that in equilibrium, each bidder's higher bid equals his higher 
valuation. We derive the lower bid  in lemmas 2-7.  Lemma 2 contains the most 
important property of the lower bid, that it must satisfy the differential equation 
in (6), which describes the exact amount of strategic underbidding.  The proof of 
lemmas 3-7 establish initial conditions and boundary values for equation (6). We 
cannot establish one initial condition that always holds. However, given the number 
of bidders and units sold, we can always derive one initial condition￿9  The differences 
are illustrated in figure 1. 
Figure 1 depicts the general form that flz(V2)  may have. There are three possible 
cases. In the first case, in which the number of bidders if strictly less than the number 
of units being sold, that is, n < k -  1, it must be the case that fl207) =  g. It is possible 
that v* > 0 and f12(v2)  = 0 for all v  2 _< v~. In the second case, where n >  k -  1, v* 
must equal 0. Thus f12(v2)  is required to be strictly monotone at all values ofv 2 from 342  C. Noussair 
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Figure 1. f12(v2)  under different values of n and k. 
0 to f. In the third case, when n =  k -  l, it must be the case that/~2(0) =  0. However 
o <  vb ~2(v~) =  0.  v* may be strictly greater than 0 so that for all v 2 _ 
Lemma 2.  If B* is a Type M  undominated symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium, then 
B*(vl, v2) =  fiE(V2); where f12(v2) =/~2(v2); for v 2 >_ v~ and ff2(v2) solves." 
ff2(v2)=  v~-T(~2(v2),  v2, ~2), ~, n, k). 
_  i  F*  t(bi2)- F~,_k+2(b~2))/  Proof:  The  first  order  conditions  require  b~-  v 2 -(  2n-k+ 
,  i  f2n_k+z(b2)  for  any  symmetric equilibrium  bidding  function  B*.  By lemma  10, 
f*  _k+ 2(b~) >  0 so the last expression is defined. Since B* is being used by all players 
and B*(vl) = vl: 
Prob(v 1 <  S~l*(b~)) =  Prob(v 1 <  b~).  (11) 
Also, because ~?B~(v2) >  0 for v2 >  02 and B*(v2) =  0 for v  2 <  v2: 
c~v  2 
Prob (S*(v2) _< b~) =  Prob (v 2 _< VE(b~z)),  (12) 
where  the  function  V2(x):[O,B*(~)] ~  Iv2, v],  and  V2(x ) =  B21*(x).  Consider  the 
probability that a randomly drawn bidder, named y ~  i, submits 2 bids that are less 
than  or equal  to b~.  The probability  that  two  of y's bids  are  less  than  b~  is  the 
probability of the following event: 
~V2(b2)~ b2 
_  i  y_b~)=  ~  .~o  O(Vl,vz)dvldV2.  (13)  Prob (b~ <  b 2, b 2 < 
Similarly, exactly one ofy's bids is less than or equal to b~ when either of the two 
following events occurs: 
f2'; 
> 32 , 32 <__ 32) =  g(Vl, v2)dvldv2,  (14)  Prob (b~  i  r  i 
b~ Equilibria in a bid auction  343 
or 
_< b2, b 2 >  b~) =  g(vl,V2)dvldV 2.  (15) 
2(b  2) 
The  last  expression  equals  0  because  it  requires  that  (v~ ___ b~,  v{ >  V2(b~)), 
an  event  that  occurs  with  probability  zero;  since  *  b ~  *  (F2n  k+l(  2)--F2n  k+2(b/)))/ 
,  i  f2,_k+z(b2) >_ 0 (because the numerator is a  probability and the denominator is a 
density),  it  must  be  the  case  that  Vz(b~)>_ b~;  but  by  assumption  v] _> v~.  The 
probability that demander y makes 0 bids less than or equal to b~ is given by: 
i  y  b2 )  g(vl,v2)dvldv2.  (16)  Prob (b] >  b2, b 2 >  = 
2G~ 
Suppose now that each of the n bidders other than bidder i draws one pair of 
valuations from G(v~, v2). Exactly l of the buyers make two bids less than or equal 
to b~, exactly m buyers make one, and exactly (n -  m -  l) bidders make zero bids 
less than or equal to b~. The probability of this event is given by: 
Prob  (exactly  1  observations  of  B*(vl i) < b~2,  exactly  m +  I  observations  of 
B*(v2 i) <_ blz) 
=  m--  L  9(va'v=)dvldv2) 
t!m!(.  -  i)'.\Jo 
g(Vl, v2)dv 1 dv 2  9(Vl, v2)dv 1  dv2]  .  (17) 
wo  "~b~  --~v~G~  b'~ 
The  previous  expression  equals  H(b 2, Vz(bi2),  G, n, m, l) where  H  is  as  defined  in 
equation (1). It follows that: 
H(b 2, V2(b~), G, n, m, l), 
l,m;2l+m=2n-k+ 1 
2n 
F*  i  2n_k+2(b2)) ~-  ~  ~,  U(b 2, V2(b~2),G,n,m, 1),  (19) 
q=2n-k + 2 l,m;21+m=q 
(F'~n_k+ a(bi2) -- F~  b i  _~+~(2)) =  (18) 
and 
(<  y  2  +  (20) 
q=2n-k+2  l.m;2  m=q  gV  2 gb~/]" 
The last three equations imply that: 
F*l--2n-k+2(b2))/f2n-k+2(b2)=T(  (~22)'  )  (  2,-k+  (b2)  F*  ,  .  ,  b~,V2(b~z) '  OV2  -1  G,n,k  . 
Since all bidders are using the same strategy, b~ must equal  .  i  B 2 (v2). Therefore: 
(21) 
(22) 344  c. Noussair 
Using equations (10), (21) and (22), we see that equation (6) and the second part of 
equation (4) must hold.  [] 
Proof of Theorem 1.  The proof follows directly from lemmas  1-7. It has now 
been shown that B*(Vl, v2) is a type M  undominated symmetric Bayes  Nash equi- 
librium, only if it equals ft.  [] 
There is underrevelation on the lower-valued unit for the following reason: since 
there is positive probability that a demander's lower bid is the k +  1st highest, he 
has some incentive to underbid for it in order to lower the price he pays for the unit 
he receives (the fact that the lower bid is the k +  1st highest implies that the higher 
bid is among the k highest, and therefore the demander receives exactly one unit). 
There is no incentive to underbid on the higher-valued unit, since in the event that 
the demander's higher bid is the k +  1st highest, he wins no units, and his profits 
are zero. Overbidding is always a dominated strategy. 
The two symmetric equilibrium bids are separable, indicating that the extent of 
underrevelation on the  lower unit  depends  only upon  the  rank  of the  unit,  the 
distribution of valuations, the number of bidders and the number of units sold, and 
is independent of the bidder's higher valuation and his higher bid. The independence 
results from the fact that the price paid is independent of the amount of the higher 
bid, and therefore the gains from lowering the final price depend only upon how 
many bids are accepted in the event that the lower bid is the k +  1st highest. 
3.2.  A  simple example 
Suppose 7(v) is uniform on the interval from 0 to 1, n +  1 =  2 and k =  3. We know 
that  ill(Vii)= vii  in  an  undominated  symmetric equilibrium.  The  calculation  of 
f12(v2), which equals v~ -  T(.), proceeds in the following manner.  First note that 
n! 
-  1. Using the fact that v 1 _> v2, we can derive the following equation 
lIm!(n-m-1)! 
which gives the probability that a bidder makes exactly two bids less than or equal 
to b~: 
Jo  g(v"v2)dvldV2 =  Jo  g(va'v2)dvldv2  =  (b~)2"  (23) 
The probability that a randomly chosen bidder makes exactly one bid less than or 
equal to b~ equals: 
fo  v~(d~) f~ g(vl,vz)dv,dv2 = 2Va(b~)-(V2(bi2)) 2 -(b~) 2.  (24) 
b~ 
and  again  using  v 1 >_ v  2,  we can derive the  probability that  a  randomly chosen 
bidder makes exactly zero bids that are less than or equal to b~. The probability is 
given by: 
fvf 
g(vl, v2)dvldv 2 =  g(vl, v2)dvldv2 = (1 -  V2(b~))  2.  (25) Equilibria in a bid auction  345 
The numerator of T equals the following expression (note 2n -  k +  1 =  0): 
E  i  i  --  V2(b2) )  .  (26)  H(b2, V2(b2),G(/),,/)z),n,m,l)=(1  i  2 
(m,l;m+ 2l= 2n-k + l) 
Next,  we  derive  the  denominator  of  T.  F2,_,+2(b~)  equals  (bi2)2+2V2(bi2)- 
(V2(b~)) 2  (b~) 2 and thereforef2,_k+2(b2)=(2-2  ~  '  -  V2(b2) ) V2(b2).  Since the equili- 
brium is symmetric, V2(b~) =/)~2. The solutions to the first order necessary conditions 
b',=fil(/)l)=/)'~;  b', >  0, 
>__tel;  bil =  0, 
(1  -  2 
b~ =  fi2(/)2)  =/)~  -  (2  i  ,  i'  -- 2/)2) V2(b 2) 
(1 -/)i )2 
￿9  _  2  . 
->/)2  (2  i  ,  i  '  -  2v2) V2(b 2) 
b >0, 
are given by: 
(27) 
with the initial condition fl2(1 ) =  1 because n <  k -  1. Solving for V2(b2)i we obtain" 
,  i  l  i 
V2(b2) -  -  v2  (29) 
2(v~ -b2)" 
a  solution can be found by setting b~ =  (v2) 2 which implies that Vz(b~) =  (b~) 1/2 and 
,  Ii  i~-i  also that V  2 =~tv2)  . We obtain: 
fl(Ul' 152) =  (/)1' (/)2) 2)  (30) 
3.3.  Suffieient conditions 
In theorem  1 we  provided  necessary  conditions  for  a  bidding  function  to  be  a 
symmetric undominated Type M  Bayes  Nash equilibrium.  In theorem 2 sufficient 
conditions are given for/3 to be an equilibrium. There are two conditions: A and B. 
Condition A  insures  that the appropriate  second order conditions are satisfied;  if 
all other demanders  use fl, the payoff function of bidder i is concave in bidder i's 
strategy. Condition B insures that fl is type M. 
Condition A:  /? satisfies Condition A  if: 
q=2n-k+2  re,l;2  m=q 
2.  0,, 
*(W2(b2)-  b2) <  •  Z  ---+  (31) 
q=2n-k+l  m,l;21+m=q  ~b2  ~W 2  ~b2  ,] 
for  all  b 2  such  that  0 _< b 2 _< ~  where  W2(x):[0, fl2(g)] --* [/)*, f],  W2(x ) = f121(x), 
where H  =  H(b2, W2(b2), G, n, m, l) 
Condition B:  fl satisfies condition B if: 
1 -- ~T/~/) 2 
>  0;  /72 >  0.  (3"2) 
1 + aT~#~?2 
=  0,  (28) 346  c. Noussair 
Theorem 2.  Suppose  that fl satisfies  (3)-(7)  and conditions  A  and B.  Under condi- 
tions A  and B, the bidding function  fl(vl, v2)= (ill(v l, v2), fl2(vl, v2)) is a symmetric 
undominated  Type M  Bayes-Nash  equilibrium. 
Proof:  The theorem is proven in lemmas 8 and 9 in the appendix.  [] 
It can be readily verified that the second order conditions hold for the example 
in the last subsection. 
4.  Summary and concluding remarks 
We generalized some important theoretical properties of a uniform price sealed bid 
auction with "first rejected bid" pricing to an independent private values environ- 
ment with two-unit demands.  We considered a  class of bidding functions called 
type M, essentially a general type of continuous monotonicity. A necessary condition 
for a bidding function to be a type M  symmetric undominated Bayes-Nash equili- 
brium was derived. The dominant strategy equilibrium of the single-unit demand 
environment results as a special case. In any equilibrium, there is underbidding for 
each  demander's  lower-valued  unit,  as  demanders,  even  as  they  behave  non- 
cooperatively, underreveal demand in an attempt to shift the market price in their 
favor. An interesting property of type M  equilibria, separability, is also obtained. 
A sufficient condition for a solution to the necessary conditions to be an equilibrium 
is also deduced and an example of a type M equilibrium is provided. 
Clearly, intuition which follows only from knowledge of equilibrium properties 
of uniform price sealed bid auctions in the single-unit demand environment is not 
valid when considering multi-unit demand environments. Although this has been 
known for some time,  this  paper extends previous results  by characterizing the 
precise extent of strategic behavior in a simple uniform price auction in a multi-unit 
demand environment. 
A.  Additional proofs 
Lemma 3.  f12(/)~)=0;  U~ =  T(O,v*,O[3~,*),G,n,k). 
v "o'/~v2(~  Proof:  Equation  (10)implies  that  for b~ =0,  0>_ Vz(0)-T(0,  2(),~-~h~-)  , 
\---~2  / 
G, n, k). The inequality holds with equality if 1/2(0) =  T  0, Vz(0  ), \~22  J  , G, n, k  , 
which implies that V2(0  ) =  v~.  [] 
Lemma 4.  f12(v2) =  0; if v2 <- v*. 
Proof:  Consider  any v  2 < v~.  Then 0 >  v  2 -  T  0, V2(0),  G, n, k  . By 
,,o  _  \  k,  gb z  )  '  equation (10), Bz(v2) -  0.  [] 
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/  ~B~(v~)  ) 
Proof:  Consider  v* =  T|0,  v*,  , G, n, k  . By lemma  10, the denominator  of 
\  av2 
the last equation, f~,  k+2(O) >  O. If the numerator  is equal to zero, it would imply 
that  v* =  O. The numerator  is: 
n! 
E  H(O, V:(O), G, n, m, I) =  E 
l,m;2l +m- 2n-k + 1  l,m;21+m=2n-k + 1 l!m!(n -- m -- l)! 
o,  ; 
* ",ao  .JO  g(vl'V2)dvedVl  oo oO  g(vl'V2)dvedVl 
?)  ~  )  X n - m - l . 
(IOLo ,. 
The last expression equals 0  unless  l =  0. If I equals 0, the expression equals: 
m!(n-  m)!  g()dl)2du1  g(.)dv2dv I  .  (34) 
m=2n-k+l  kdo  ,dO  /  ',dO  dV2(O ) 
Since  m_> 0,  the  last  expression  equals  0  if  n >  k-1.  Therefore,  v~ =  0  when 
n>k-1.  [] 
Lemma  6.  /~2(~)  =  tT; /f n  <  k  --  1. 
Proof:  Consider  T(B~(~),  f, OB*(g), G,n,k).  The  denominator  ofT  is positive  by 
c3v  2 
lemma  10. If v~ =  15, the numerator  of T  equals: 
n! 
E  H(B~(~), ~, ~, ~, m, l) =  E 
l,m;21+m=2n  k+ 1  l,m;2l+m=2n-k+  1 l!m!(n  -  m  -  I)! 
*  v  lm 
*(;:2(v)fff,q(l)l,v2)dl)2du1)lt;;i(v),fog(Vl,V2)dv2dVl 
* (~  ~  tn  m  1 
\  J ,*2(e) 'j  g(vl' V2)dv2dVl  "  (35) 
The  previous  equation  equals  0  unless  n =  m +  I. It also equals  0  unless  2l +  m = 
2n -  k +  1. n =  m +  l and  2l +  m =  2n -  k +  1 cannot  be satisfied simultaneously  if 
n<k-1  since(21+m=2n-k+l)  ,~  (21+n-l=2n-k  +  l)  ~  (l=n-k  +  l). 
Since l>_ 0, it follows that ifn <  k-1,  T(B*(O),~  8B*(f)G,n,k)  =  0 implying that 
B*(~) =  ~.  []  \  '  &2  '  ] 
Lemma  7.  /72(0 ) =  0;. if n =  k -  1. 
a~(0)  ) 
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of Tequals: 
n! 
H(B*(O),O,G,n,m,I)=  Z 
l,m;2l+m=2n-k+  1  l,m;2l+m=2n-k+ 1 l!m!(n -- m -- 1)! 
),(fo fo  ; 
0(/21, v2)dv2dv 1  g(vl, v2)dv2dvl 
\,Jo  dO  z(o) 
*  O(vl, v2)dv2dvl  .  (36) 
~(o)  o 
Equation (36) equals zero unless l =  0 and m =  0. If l =  m =  0, (36) equals zero unless 
2n-k  +  1  equals  zero.  If 2n-  k +  1 =0,  then  n r  k-  1  if  n >0.  Therefore,  for 
,,  n.  ,m ,ie  that  = 0 when n  ~ 
k-  1.  6'v2  \  --  / 
Lemma 8.  If condition B  holds, fi is Type M. 
Proof:  Suppose condition B holds. Clearly 3(0, 0) =  (0, 0) and 3 is continuous  in v 1 
and  v2.  ~1(v2) =  0,  ~2(vl) =  v* and  31(~, ~) =  f  >  32(~, 0-  Since  3x(v0 =  vl, 83~ > O. 
8vl 
Now consider 32(v2)= v2-  T(32,  v2,832,G,n,k}/\  for 32 >0.  The partial derivative 
\  /t  Ov  2 
of 32 with respect to v 2 satisfies: 
832 _  1  8T 832  8T  1 -- 8T/Sv 2 > 0  (37) 
81)  2  832 8u 2  8u 2  1 q- 8T/832 
Finally, since fl is separable: 831 =  832 =  0.  [] 
8v2  8vl 
Lemma 9.  If conditions  A  and  B  hold,  3  is  an  undominated  Type  M  symmetric 
Bayes- Nash equilibrium. 
Suppose all bidders except for bidder i are using the bidding function fl(vl,/)2)' 
The objective function for bidder i is given by: 
i 
En~[3  =  (Utl --M2n_k+l)f2n_k+l(M2n_k+l)dM2n_k+  1 
b 
f0 ~  / 
+  (vii +v2--2Mz.-k+2)f2,-k+2(M2,-k+2)dMz,  k+2 
+ (v,  1 _  bi2)(F2,_ k+ 1(b2  )i _  F2,_k+ 2(b~))  (38) 
where F,(x) =F]il ft. Bidder i chooses bil and b~, to maximize the objective function 
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The first order necessary conditions are given by equations (39) and (40): 
c~E~ i 
-(v~,  -b'l)f2,_k+,(b~,)=O;  b'~ >0, 
<  0;  b'~ =  0,  (39) 
63  E ~ i 
-  (v~ -  b~)fE._k+z(b~)  -(F2._k+  ~(b~) -  F2.  k+2(b~)) =  0;  b~ >  0, 
~b~ 
<0;  b~ =0.  (40) 
The  second  derivatives  are  (omitting  the  superscript  designating  demander  for 
notational ease): 
~2ETz 
--  =(Vx  -  bt)f'2._k+~(b~)-f2,  k+~(b~),  (41)  avf 
02E7~ 
8b t 8b 2 
82E~ 
~2E7c 
-  =  0,  (42) 
8b28bl 
--  =  (v2 -- b2) f'2._ k + 2 (b2) -- f  2.-k +, (b2)"  (43) 
Ob~ 
6q2Eg  6~2En 
The second order conditions are then:  ~-  <  0, and ~7i~2-~b  2  < O. 
It follows from (39)that if  f2.  k+~(b~)>0, then bx =Vl forvl _>0. Iff2._k+l(b~2)=O, 
then  there  can  be  more  than  one  solution  to  (39)  but  any  strategy  is  weakly 
dominated by b l =  v l. Therefore bil =  ill(V*1) =  vi~ - Since fl being used by all players 
besides i and flis type M, we can derive the following equation: Prob (exactly l obser- 
/)-i  ~  i  rations of fll(V~ i) <  b~, exactly m +  I observations of f12( 2  ) -  b2) 
l!m[(n -- m -  l)!  9@1, v2)dvl dv2 
(fT,;/  f; 
g(vl, v2)dvldV2  g(v 1, v2)dvldv21  .  (44) 
The previous expression equals H(bi2, W2(biz), G, n, m, l), and it follows that: 
k+l(bi2)-F2,  k+  b'  b i  (b~,W2(b2),(c~W2(bi2)']  -~  (F:. -  -  2(  2))/f2n-k+2(2)  =  T\  \  ab2  J 
We can rewrite the first order condition in (40) for b~ >  0 as: 
=v2-  \  c~b~  /  ,G,n,k  . 
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Recalling the fact that W(x) = fi2 ~(x), we see that: 
]~2(V2) =  /)2  T(  i  ui  0fi2(/)~)  n,k)  (48)  '  --  fl2(/)2)'  2'  ~V  2  ' G,  . 
The first order conditions  also imply that for b~ =  0: 
0 >_ 1412(0)  -  T  fl2(v~),  2, ~,  G, •,  k  .  (49) 
or2 
The  last  inequality  holds  with  equality  when  W2(0 ) =  v~.  Now  consider  some 
o 
V  2  <  V~. 
0~/) 2 -- Z(O,/)~,(~-l,a,  vI, k).  (50' 
\  \  0b~  / 
By (40), be(v~) =  flz(V~) =  0. 
C  ""  *  ~//'"  *  0flz(V~)  "]  F2"  t(0)--F2n-k+2(0)  t0  onslaer/)2  ~  1tl3,/32,  ----  -, G, n, k  =  k +  By Lemma 
\  o/)~  /  f~~ 
f2._k+ 2(0) >  0. Also, as in lemma 5, F2._k+ ~(0) -  f2n_k+ 2(0 ) =  0 ifn >  k -  1 imply- 
(  Ofl2(v) Gn'k) =Oifn<k-l'  ing that v~ =  0 ifn >  k -  1. As in lemma 6, T  f12(~), ~,--,  , 
0/)2 
andthereforefl2(O=~ifn<k-1.  Finally, as in lemma 7, T(fi2(O),O,~,G,n,k)= 
\  (7/)2  / 
0, implying that fi(0) =  0, for n =  k -  1. 
We have now shown  that fi(/3~,/)2) is a  solution to the first order conditions  in 
(39) and (40). If the appropriate second order conditions  hold, fl is a  best response. 
The second order conditions  are: 
02Elz 
--(v 1-bl)f'2"  k+l(bl)--f2n_k+i(bl)<0  (51) 
0b~  z 
02Eg 
=  (v2 -  b2)f~.-k+ 2(b2) -f2.-k+  z(b2) <  0.  (52)  Ob~ 
02E/r 
--  <  0  is satisfied  if bl =  vl  and f2.-k+ l(b~) >  0.  If fz._k+ ~(b~) =  0,  then  many 
0b 2  02En 
solutions are possible but b~ =  vl dominates any solution that has bx #  v 1. ~  <  0 
is insured by condition  A. To see this, consider:  0b2 
=  E  E  ow2  
OH 
i  -/  ~2  ~/"  (53) 
q=2n-k+2  md;21+m=q 
Equation (53) implies that f'2n-k+ 2(b~) 
=  E  E  \~W 2  0b22  q-  +  2  +  --  (54)  q=2n  k+2  2l+m=q  Obi?  Ob~zOW2  Ob  2  a  i  0W2\ Ob  2 /  / 
and  it  is  now  apparent  from  equations  (31),  (52)  and  (54)  that  assumption  A  is 
02Enlfl 
satisfied  if and  only  if --  <  0  for all  b 2  such  that 0 <_ b2 <- O. (En i is  strictly 
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concave in b~ when all demanders besides bidder i use the strategy fl). We have now 
shown that fl is a best response to itself under conditions A and B.  [] 
Lemma 10.  If all n players besides bidder i use a bidding function that is type M  and 
undominated,  then f  v(x) > 0 for 0 <_ x  <  B2(15 , 15). 
Proof:  Recall  that  F~  equals  Prob(At  least  l  bidders  make  2  bids  that  are  less 
than  or equal  to x, at least  m +  l bidders  make  at least  I  bid  that is less  than  or 
equal to x). 
The probability that a randomly chosen bidder makes 2 bids that are less than 
or equal to x is given by: 
fff/g(vl,V2)dv2dvl.  (55) 
The  term  in  (55)  follows  from  the  fact  that  if B  is  undominated,  that  v~ >_ v~ > 
B2(v  ~, v~) (bidding an amount higher than one's valuation is dominated). The term 
is clearly strictly increasing  in x  if B  is  type M  and  undominated  for x  such that 
0 _< x <  15. Now consider the probability that a  randomly chosen bidder makes at 
least one bid that is less than or equal to x. The probability equals: 
1 -  g(v 1, v2)dv2dv 1.  (56) 
B  2 a(v21vl  =x) '  ~- t(vzlva =x) 
The last term results from the fact that underbidding on the higher valued  unit is 
dominated by bidding an amount equal to the higher valuation and from the fact 
that v] >_ v~. This last  equation  is  also strictly increasing  in x  for all  x  such  that 
0 <  x_< 15.  It  follows  that  Fv(x)  is  strictly  increasing  in  x  and  that  fv(x)> 0; 
0 _~ X _< B2(15  , 15).  [] 
Lemma 11.  Enlfl is twice differentiable. 
Proof:  By  assumption  7~C 2.  It  follows  that  g(v~,v=)eC 1,  since  9QJl,t)2)  = 
2y(v2)@(Vz)(7(vl)  -- y(v2))dy(vl).  Since g(v~, v2)~C ~, ~g j'~g(Vl, vz)dv2dv~  is twice dif- 
ferentiable with respect to x  and y and thus continuous in x  and y. It follows that 
H(x, y, G, n, m, l), the product of twice differentiable functions, is twice differentiable 
with  respect  to  x  and  y,  and  thus  continuous  in  x  and  y.  Therefore,  F~(x)= 
2n 
Zq  = v Zl,ra;  2l + m = q H (x, fl- 1  (x), G, n, m, l) is twice differentiable in x. This implies that 
f~(x) is differentiable and continuous in x. 
En~(b~,b~2)  is  differentiable  in  b~  and  b 2  because  an  anti-derivative  of  a 
continuous  function  is  differentiable.  Clearly  therefore,  the  first  derivatives  are 
differentiable  in b~l  and b~.  We have now shown that Ezr~(b~l, b~2)is twice differen- 
tiable.  [] 
References 
Forsythe, R., Isaac, M.: Demand revealing mechanisms for private good auctions. Res. in Exp. Econ. 
2, 45  61 (1982) 
Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J. Finance 16, 8-37 (1961) 
Weber, R.: Multiple-object auctions. In: Auctions, bidding and contracting, pp. 165-190. New York: 
New York University Press 1983 